Institutional Change and Economic Growth in Pakistan by Younis, Fizza
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Institutional Change and Economic
Growth in Pakistan
Fizza Younis
1 June 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72938/
MPRA Paper No. 72938, posted 10 August 2016 08:41 UTC
Title: Institutional Change and Economic Development in Pakistan 
Author: Fizza Younis* 
Acknowledgement: I’d like to thank Dr. Muhammad Aslam Chaudhary (Professor and 
Head of Economics Department at University of Lahore) for his guidance.
                                                           
* PhD Scholar, University of Lahore, Lahore, Pakistan 
Abstract 
This study attempts to isolate causes of institutional change and investigates the role it 
plays in achieving economic development. Institutional change is vital for sustainable 
economic growth but literature shows that related empirical evidence is limited. In this 
paper Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes Model is employed. The results reveal that 
in case of Pakistan control of corruption, rule of law, privatization, liberalization, and 
voice accountability are the most important causes of institutional change. In addition to 
this export orientation also have a positive effect on institutional change whereas 
macroeconomic instability has a negative impact. Furthermore, there exists a significant 
positive relation between institutional change and economic development in Pakistan. 
The first section of the study provides an introduction, and section two provides relevant 
literature review. In section three methodology employed by the study is discussed. 
Section four presents results and discussion. Section five chalks out policy implications 
and concludes the study. 
JEL Classification: O1; O10; O43; P35 
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1. Introduction 
 Institutions play a pivotal role in economic development. Institutional change is 
an important determinant of pattern and speed of development. Despite of this, 
institutions, institutional change and reforms are not an area which economists and 
researchers understand well. There exists discrepancy in theory of institutions and its 
implications. Understanding of institutions and institutional development remains to be 
an ongoing process even though their importance has been well established in literature. 
According to North, 1990 formal rules and informal norms, along with their enforcement 
mechanism are called institutions. Formal institutions are comprised of legal and judicial 
systems. Whereas, informal institutions include norms, culture, ethnic beliefs and so on. 
These are just as important as formal rules because they help shape the society and 
increase overall welfare, when used in a judicious manner. Effective institutions lead to 
increase in efficiency, transparency and competition in the interaction between private 
and public economic agents. This will in turn cause an increase in the levels of 
investment, savings, social capital, decrease in transaction cost and better management. 
 It is proven, time and again, that Pakistan is facing institutional decay, especially 
since 1990s. This has lead to increase in poverty, inequality and inefficiency in economic 
system as a whole. Many studies have shown that public investment either has 
insignificant or negative impact on economic growth of Pakistan. There is a pressing 
need for institutional development to ensure that public investment adds to productive 
capacity rather than being wasted.
1
 
 Boettke and Fink (2011) critically reviewed the importance of institutions and 
institutional change. The study argues that institutions are far more important than 
policies. In other words developing strong institutions is more important than devising 
right public policies. For example, Institutions for securing private property rights are the 
key to sustain economic growth in developing countries. It is argued that governments in 
these countries are mostly corrupt, therefore, they should have as little interference in 
economic decision making as possible. The study does not discard importance of policies 
altogether rather focuses on the fact that because of predatory behaviour of government, 
policies fail to be effective. Resources are not utilized productively. It is easier to avoid 
private predation if property rights are enforced. But public predation is difficult to avoid. 
The insititutional change is required but it must come endogeneously. If it is brought 
about exogeneously via foreign interferenece or domestic policies, it will not last long. 
The reason is that institutional change in inherent in belief systems of society. Although 
this study makes some valid points it does not back them with empirical evidence. An 
important question to be asked is that to what extend private property right institutions 
will be able to steer resources towards productive activities. Furthermore, if policies are 
deemed ineffective then what factors can help in evolving the institutions of a country. It 
might take a long time and until then evils like poverty will continue to persist in 
developing countries. 
In case of Pakistan an array of research support the view that institutional failure is a 
major cause of economic inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of policies. Table 1 shows 
Pakistan’s ranks of various World Governance Indicators. 
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Table 1: Governance Indicators’ Percentile Rank of Pakistan, 1996 & 2013 
Percentile Rank* 1996 2013 
Control of Corruption 8.8 17.7 
Government Effectiveness 30.7 23.4 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 12.5 0.94 
Regulatory Quality 30.9 24.8 
Rule of law 28.7 20.8 
Voice and Accountability 28.8 24.6 
*0 corresponds to lowest rank and 100 to highest rank 
Source: World Development Indicators, Online Data Bank, Retrieved; April, 2015 
 
Indicators presented in this table encompass legal, political and economic 
institutions. It shows that the country is among those where institutional quality is very 
low. It can be seen that for all indicators Pakistan’s rank in the world is very low. Control 
of corruption is that only indicator for which Pakistan’s rank has improved. For all other 
indicators Pakistan’s rank in the world has further deteriorated from 1996 to 2013. In 
case of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism Pakistan is among countries at 
the very bottom. It has deteriorated from 12.5 in 1996 to only 0.9 in 2013. In country’s 
current institutional environment there are two possible ways to tackle the issue of 
inefficient economic system. One option is to analyze the process of institutional change. 
And provide a framework to make institutions effective. Second option is to device 
policies which will work under existing institutions.2 When institutional economists focus 
on first option they are assuming that institutions can be changed while ignoring the cost 
of implementing institutional reforms. 
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Figure 1 shows various institutional quality indices for Pakistan form 1996 to 
2013. It can be seen that for all indices values has decreased over time, indicating 
institutional deterioration. The worst situation is in case of Political stability and absence 
of violence/terrorism, as this index decreased from -1.2 to -2.5.3 
 Figure 1: Institutional Quality Indicators of Pakistan, 1996-2013 
Source: World Development Indicators, Online Data Bank, Retrieved; April, 2015 
  The purpose of this study is to; 
• Analyze process of institutional development and measure institutional change.  
• Study the role of institutional development in economic performance of Pakistan. 
• Chalk out relevant policy implications. 
                                                           
3 All indicators range from -2.5 to 2.5 (approximately). Positive values indicate better institutional quality 
while negative values indicate low quality institutions. 
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 Study is organized as follows; section two provides relevant literature review. In 
section three methodology employed by the study is discussed. Section four presents 
results and discussion. Section five chalks out policy implications and concludes the 
study. 
2. Literature Review 
 This section reviews existing literature on institutional change and its role in 
economic development in Pakistan as well as other countries. The purpose of this 
endeavor is to form guidelines for carrying out present research. Conceptualization of 
institutions, institutional change and their importance for economic development is not a 
new debate but it is an ongoing one. Hamilton (1919) claims that institutional approach to 
economics started when economists started focusing on practical problems related to 
human well-being. This study criticizes neo-classical approach to economics and 
highlights main characteristics of institutional economics which make it a better and more 
comprehensive approach to economic theory. 
 Hussain (2003) studies institutional structure of Pakistan. It analyzes role of 
institutions in economic growth. Study states that governance system in the country is 
rent based. Because of this Pakistan has failed to achieve sustainable economic growth. It 
provides a detailed analysis of institutions which has lead to low savings and investment, 
poverty, exploitation of resources by elite group, injustice and poor economic 
performance. It further argues that neoliberal view which states that markets are self 
regulatory and there is no need for intervention, except control of money supply, is 
unfound for. Thus there is need for structural reforms to sustain economic growth through 
participatory development. The study is a contribution to existing literature on an 
important topic. But it fails to take social institutions under consideration. Furthermore, it 
does not provide the cost of institutional reforms. As pointed out by Chang, (2011) this is 
a common mistake which institutional economists make. They simply assume 
institutional change to be feasible, without providing insights about the process itself. 
 Ronald (2004) provides a conceptual framework related to institutional change. It 
compares fast-moving institutions and slow-moving institutions while focusing on their 
interaction with each other. Political institutions are considered fast-moving and social 
institutions are slow-moving. Legal system changes faster than social norms but slower 
than political institutions. Study points out that fast-moving institutions can influence 
slow moving institutions but these should also change continously for consistent 
institutional change to occur. Culture and technology both can play an equal role in 
changing th institutions. It reinforces the importance of institutions for economic 
development. This study is a step forward in understanding institutional change but 
economic theory is still lacking in this regard as economists shy away from incorporating 
cultural norms and social values to debate of economic growth. 
 Azfar, (2006) provides insights about institutions which are required in order to 
make economic policy practicable. The study analyzes various layers of institutions. 
They are divided according to time period required to change them. Social institutions are 
slowest to change, while, private institutions change more quickly. Political and legal 
institutions lie inbetween these two. It concludes that institutions which lower transaction 
costs and secure property rights are important to bring changes in private sphere. 
Moreover, it is better to devise framework which suits current social realities as social 
institutions may change centuries to change. The study is notable contribution to new 
institutional economics, which follow Williomson’s (1999) hierarchy of institutions. 
Since it does not provide application of these theoratical propositions, hence, it is difficult 
to determine whether these can be implicated or not. 
 Ahrens & Mengerighaus (2006) analyzes role of market-enhancing governance 
institutions in China’s economic success over the years. China is different from other 
transitional economies because it did not follow conventional economic reforms rather its 
own approach to reforms and decentralization of economy. This has lead to sustained 
economic growth. Even in the absence of fully protected private property rights, Chinese 
economy thrived by relying on innovation and experimentation in its institutional 
reforms. Gradually, country improved its governance structure and strengthened 
institutional enforcement. Although, the study strengthened view point of importance of 
institutions it does not provide any clear cut path to institutional change which other 
transitional economies can follow. Institutional change is a dynamic process and needs to 
be analyzed for every stage of development so that a coherent picture can be formanized. 
In spite of this China’s experience does provides insights about institutional change and a 
main finding consitent in literature is that there are no hard and fast rules for institutional 
change, therefore, history and local environment should be considered while devicing 
reforms (Cao). 
 Zakaria & Fida (2009) has analyzed the impact of political institutions on per 
capita income of Pakistan. Study uses time series data from 1947 to 2006 and employs 
methodology of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and sensitivity analysis. 
Literature provides varrying evidence; positive effect of democracy on growth, negative 
effect and in some cases no effect. The focal point of this study is to provide time-series 
evidence, since almost all previous studies utilize cross-country analysis. Study uses 
traditional output growth model while incorporating variable of democracy as a control 
variable. Results shows that democracy has a negative impact of per capita growth rate. 
Study provides insights about an important ongoing debate but non-availibility of many 
important variables (e.g. corruption, role of balck market etc.) poses some doubt. Another 
drawback of the study is that it estimates a long-run growth model, taking democracy as a 
continous variable rather than dichotomous. 
 Musole (2009) analyzes the importance of property right institutions, transaction 
costs and institutional change for the effectiveness of public policies. Public policies are 
not always able to achieve their well-intended goals. There are certain constrains that can 
lead to negative externalities as a result of policies which are not implemented efficiently. 
Thus, institutions matter more than policies. The focus of study are institutions related to 
transaction costs, especially propert rights.  For illustration it considers land transactions. 
It shows how rural land reforms can be implemeted in a way that does not have negative 
impact on urban land markets. Results support the theory that public policy, transaction 
costs and property rights are interlinked. A framework is developed to study economic 
outcome of public policies. An important contribution of the study is providing a 
multidimensional model which can be modified for further research. However, the study 
is mostly qualitative rather than quantitative. It may be because concepts of transaction 
costs and property rights are not always easy to quantify. 
 Ahrens (2009) studies the importance of institutional change for policy reforms. It 
analyzes China and HPAEs sustainable growth, focusing on institutional development in 
these countries. Paper provides important implications related to good governance, 
institutions and successful implementation of economic reforms. Because economic, 
political and social institutions are interlinked, therefore, economic reforms do not bring 
expected results in many developing countries. There is need for institutional change 
which will lead to good governance and effective policy implementations. Study 
identifies four pillars of good governance; protection of property rights, prevention of 
corruption and rent seeking behavior, creating technical and administrative skills and 
establishment of principal economic institutions for market exchange. This study can be 
improved further by analyzing some cases of failed institutional transition and comparing 
them with China and HPAEs. This can lead to better understanding of why some 
institutions fail in some countries whereas they succeed in others. 
 Khawaja & Khan (2009) reviews theories of institutional economics, historical 
experiences of various ccountries and implications for bringing institutional Change in 
Pakistan. Study has analyzed some countries which experienced institutional change 
while others which did not experience such changes even under same circumstances. In 
Pakistan rent seeking behavior exists this Uk and Netherland’s experience will not apply. 
Fiscal constraints and strategic interests of foreign powers also failed to bring about 
institutional change in the country. Revolutions seems unlikely as well. Study concludes 
that there is a need for gradual approach making education a key factor. It argues that it is 
easier to bring institutional change in a homogenoeous society by changing their belief 
system. controlling education of masses upto a certain level will help this cause. In short 
institutional reforms should begin from education system in Pakistan. In light of given 
arguments it seems effective to begin institutional change from changing education 
system but, according to heirarchy theory of institutions, social institutions may take 
centuries to change. Changes in education system can very well fail to cause expected 
change in belief system of society. Economic institutions can be changed in only few 
years. It goes without argumuing that institutions which are easiest to change will have an 
impact on other institutions as they are all interlinked. Thus economic reforms should be 
the focal point of policy makers rather than social change. 
 Empirical researches show institutional failure as a cause of economic 
inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of policies. There is the question of causality from 
economic development to institutional change. Existing literature on institutional change 
is woefully lacking. Most of the studies have focused on single or few dimensions of the 
phenomenon. There is no clear path that will lead to such changes and these implications 
must be kept in mind while analyzing role of institutional development on economic 
performance. Moreover institutional change is a multidimensional phenomenon. Hence it 
should be measured in a composite manner rather than focusing on single (or few) sub-
dimensions. 
3. Methodology and Data 
 In this section methodology and data are discussed. First it provides theoretical 
background. Afterwards methodology employed by this study is developed. Results 
obtained after carrying out the study are discussed in the next section. 
3.1. Theoretical Background 
 Historians have always understood the importance of institutional change in 
evolution of political, social and economic framework within which a society operates. 
Historians, however, base their deductions on logic rather than well developed theories or 
mathematics. In recent years economists have also started to realize that institutional 
change is the determining factor behind pattern and speed of development. According to 
North (1990) competition is the key to institutional change. It forces organizations and 
economic agents to continuously invest in knowledge and innovate. It is a dynamic 
multidimensional process. Institutional framework will lead to determination of the kind 
of knowledge which has maximum pay-off. Feedback of information and externalities 
caused by institutional matrix make this process path dependent.4 
 There are various theories which try to conceptualize institutional change. Some 
consider it exogenous while others view it as endogenous to growth process. Similarly, 
some economists believe that institutional change can be influenced by reforms, political 
processes and deliberate change in rules and laws. Whereas, there are many others who 
hold the view that institutional change is a result of evolutionary process. Yet, some 
economists believe it to be a combination of both evolutionary and deliberately designed 
process. Despite varying views on the process of institutional change, there is consensus 
about its being a dynamic multidimensional phenomenon. It encompasses political, legal, 
social and economic transition. Furthermore, it is believed that all these dimensions are 
interlinked with each other. This makes institutional change hard to measure. There is no 
single measure which can adequately explain this process. The work related to 
measurement of institutional change is limited. 
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 Theory suggests that institutional change is caused by a set of exogenous 
variables and it then influences economic outcomes.5 Moreover, institutional change is an 
unobservable indicator which is affected by various observable indicators. These 
indicators include measurements of political change, social evolution, changes in legal 
system, economic system and interaction between all these. Literature shows that social 
institutions take centuries to change. These are embedded into culture, religion and 
regional norms and values. Political institutions can be changed overnight. Similarly, 
legal and economic institutions can also be changed in relatively short time periods. Once 
institutional change occurs it influences economic development of a country. It can lead 
to innovation, technological changes, competition, transparency and sustained economic 
growth. 
3.2. Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) Model 
 The model used in this study incorporates all dimensions of institutional change 
rather than focusing on single sub-dimension. MIMIC approach is used for this purpose. 
It is a special case of simultaneous equation model which accounts for unobserved 
components. Study follows Raiser et al. (2001) with some improvements, that is 
extending time series, and including additional variables. Moreover, it is a time-series 
rather than cross-country analysis. It uses a structural model of institutional change where 
institutional change is taken as an unobservable latent variable which depends on various 
observable exogenous and endogenous variables. Present study is conducted for Pakistan, 
taking data from 1996-2013.6 In addition to this study uses a different set of variables to 
                                                           
5 (Raiser, Tommaso and Weeks) 
6 Years are chosen on the basis of availability of data on institutional quality and related indicators. 
measure institutional change, as well as, other related variables. The reason behind this is 
that Pakistan is a developing country and it is different from transitional economies in 
many ways. Financial and legal institutions are not well developed in Pakistan and social 
and cultural matrix also makes it unique.7 Model can be summarized in following 
equations;8 
 = 

∗ +       (1) 
∗ =  +  + ⋯ +  +  +       (2) 
 =  +       (3) 
 Where;  is an independent measure of institutional change, (k = 1,…., m) and 
each  is denoted by ∗, β represent initial conditions factor,  represents a set of 
exogenous variables which cause institutional change and  is a vector of these 
observable exogenous variables. Because institutional change cannot be directly 
measures, hence it is not possible to estimate equation (1) and (2). Both equations are 
combined and solved for reduce form to obtain equation (3).9 Estimates of equations (1) 
and (2) can be obtained using dynamic MIMIC model for institutional change. 
3.3. Specification of Indicators and Data 
 In this section indicators used to estimate dynamic MIMIC model are discussed in 
detail. It also states data sources used in this study. The specified model is comprised of 
unobservable institutional change latent variable, observable exogenous variables which 
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8 For more details and derivation of the model see Raiser et al. (2001). 
9 Parameters and coefficients in equations (1) and (3) are vectors. 
cause institutional change and observable endogenous variables which also influence 
institutional change. As institutional change is an unobservable indicator it can be 
measured by a common factor of variables which cause it. 
 Institutions are path dependent. There are initial factors which may influence 
institutional change in a country. In this study three such factors are considered, 
geographical, cultural and legacy of political institutions. Study uses natural resources 
endowments and proximity to modern democratic countries as proxy for initial 
geographical conditions. Former is expected to have a negative impact of institutional 
change as greater natural resources rent removes incentive for institutional reforms. Later 
is expected to positively impact institutional change as close proximity to modern 
democratic society can facilitate institutional reforms in a country. These are expected to 
cause institutional changes. To represent cultural heritage study uses dummy for religion 
and ethnic identity. As a measure of political institutions legacy, study utilizes a variable 
of number of years that country spent under democracy and a dummy for national 
sovereignty. Percentage of population living in urban areas and expenditure in research 
and development are also included as initial conditions for institutional change. 
 Indicators which can cause institutional changes are extent of privatization, 
liberalization, trade orientation, political rights, capacity of state, and macroeconomic 
stability. Some of these are taken as exogenous while others as endogenous. Some are 
continuous variables while others are ordinal. 
 To identify unobservable institutional change variable, study uses six governance 
indicators. Data is taken from World Bank’s online database. These include, control of 
corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism, rule of law and voice and accountability indicators. Rationale behind 
using these indicators is that if they represent institutional quality then these variables 
must measure a common underlying factor. This can be seen as a type of factor analysis. 
Study tries to identify said factor. 
4. Results and Discussion 
 The data comprises World Development Indicators, World Governance Indicators 
and World Freedom Indicators, data sources include World Bank database and Freedom 
House database. Data cover time period of 1996 to 2013. List of variables is provided in 
table 2. 
To identify cause of institutional change and study key relationships between ordinal 
variables, correlation matrices are constructed and results are provided in table 3. Part (A) 
shows correlation between governance indicators. It can be seen that government 
effectiveness highly correlates with political stability and absence of violence/terrorism. 
Regulatory quality is highly correlated with voice accountability. Similarly voice 
accountability and corruption are correlated with government effectiveness. In part (B) 
correlation between initial conditions and institutions is given. It can be seen that most of 
these variables show significant correlation, thus, proving that institutions are path 
dependent. Part (C) shows correlation between institutions and structural variables. 
Again, we see that most of these variables are associated with each other. 
It can be seen that government effectiveness is negatively correlated with budget 
deficit. There is high positive correlation between exports and political institutions. 
Political stability is highly and positively correlated with indicators of freedom and 
accountability. Extend of privatization is positively correlated with institutional indicators 
and negatively with budget deficit. 
Table 2: List of Indicators Used to Estimate MIMIC Model 
Initial Factors Measurement 
Indicators 
Structural Indicators 
GDP Per Capita Growth Rate 
(GCP) 
Control of Corruption 
(CC) 
Macroeconomic stability ( inflation 
(In)  and budget deficit (BD) as % 
of GDP) 
Wealth in Natural Resources (NRE) Government 
Effectiveness (GE) 
Average of Civil liberties Index and 
Political liberties Index (ACP) 
Share of the Population Living in 
Urban Areas (UrP) 
Political Stability and 
Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
(PSAV) 
Exports as % of GDP (Ex) 
Dummy for political legacy (DPS) 
(1 if democratic gov. and 0 if 
military rule) 
Regulatory Quality 
(RQ) 
Government Expenditure as 
percentage of GDP (GovE) 
R&D Expenditures (RDE) Rule of law (RL) Extent of Privatization (Domestic 
Credit to Private Sector as % of 
GDP) (DC) 
Ethnic heterogeneity (DE)= 2 if > 
95% pop. Belong to dominating 
ethnicity, 1 if <95% but >75% pop. 
Belong to dominating ethnicity, 0 if 
<75% ppo. Belong to dominating 
ethnicity 
Voice and 
Accountability (VA) 
Extent of Liberalization (exports 
value index) (ExV) 
Religion (DR) = 1 if >95% pop. 
Have dominating religion, 0 
otherwise 
  
Source: Self Constructed 
  
  
This result is as expected because we have considered availability of credit to 
private sector as its indicators. Exports and government expenditures are negatively 
correlated, this is opposite of transition economies.10 Furthermore, indicators of 
macroeconomic stability are negatively correlated with indicators of freedom and voice 
accountability. As mostly variables are highly correlated with each other, hence, it can be 
deduced that they share same underlying factors and can be used for MIMIC estimation. 
 Parameters of measurement and structural equations of MIMIC model are given 
in table 4. Stata output and goodness of fit tests are presented in table 1 and 2 of 
Appendix. All variables are significant and model is a good fit. Measurement equation 
shows that control of corruption, government effectiveness and political stability and 
absences of violence/terrorism are significantly influenced by institutional change. On the 
other hand regulatory quality, rule of law and voice accountability have a significant 
impact on institutional change in Pakistan. Control of corruption, rule of law and voice 
accountability has greatest impact on institutional change in Pakistan. 
 Structural parameters are also significant. It can be seen that privatization and 
liberalization have a positive impact of institutional change. Macroeconomic instability 
has a negative impact, but budget deficit has a positive impact on institutional change. 
The reason behind this may be that greater budget deficit provides more incentive for 
institutional reforms. Exports value has a positive impact on institutional change this 
support theory that trade orientation facilitates institutional changes in an economy. In 
this model average of civil liberties and political liberties (ACP) and initial condition 
scores are constrained variables. Restrictions can be introduced to deal with this issue. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrices 
(A) 
(B) 
 
 
 
 
 
          VA    -0.3883  -0.4332  -0.2979   0.7128   0.1555   1.0000
          RL    -0.2621   0.3468   0.4310   0.1606   1.0000
          RQ     0.0651   0.0017  -0.0820   1.0000
        PSAV     0.0689   0.6972   1.0000
          GE     0.4428   1.0000
          CC     1.0000
                                                                    
                     CC       GE     PSAV       RQ       RL       VA
          DR          .        .        .
         RDE    -0.6169   1.0000
        DPS1     1.0000
                                         
                   DPS1      RDE       DR
          DR          .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .
         RDE     0.4485   0.2307  -0.6318  -0.0317  -0.3370  -0.2048   0.8441   0.6962
        DPS1    -0.6972  -0.2794   0.1164   0.4907   0.8393   0.7482  -0.7401  -0.2667
         UrP     0.2565  -0.4251  -0.9568  -0.1033  -0.3166  -0.1309   0.7255   1.0000
         NRE     0.5698  -0.1264  -0.7055  -0.1487  -0.6708  -0.3044   1.0000
          VA    -0.2932  -0.0874  -0.1114   0.8533   0.6167   1.0000
          RL    -0.8076   0.0577   0.2155   0.4025   1.0000
          RQ     0.0919   0.0153  -0.1229   1.0000
        PSAV    -0.1989   0.5324   1.0000
          GE     0.2306   1.0000
          CC     1.0000
                                                                                      
                     CC       GE     PSAV       RQ       RL       VA      NRE      UrP
(C) 
 
Table 4: MIMIC Model of Institutional Change: Parameters Estimates 
Structural 
Equation 
 Measurement 
Equation 
 
 
 
α  
 
In -0.3926284 CC 0.966436 
BD 0.2407682 GE 0.490961 
ACP 0 (constrained) PSAV -0.43576 
Ex -0.3220035 RQ 0.216434 
GovE -0.1062656 RL -0.92734 
ExV 0.6775871 VA -0.58631 
DC 0.1756636   
InCon 0 (constrained)   
 Source: Calculated by the author 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 It is well-established that institutions play an important role in economic 
development. Institutional change is a continuous process and it is vital for sustainable 
          DC     0.3412  -0.2998  -0.4839   1.0000
         ExV    -0.6897   0.1164   1.0000
        GovE    -0.0417   1.0000
          Ex     1.0000
                                                  
                     Ex     GovE      ExV       DC
          DC     0.3026   0.6711   0.4064   0.2784  -0.1840   0.0867  -0.4283   0.7214
         ExV    -0.1393  -0.7202  -0.9326   0.0019   0.3237   0.5402   0.4665  -0.8274
        GovE    -0.2793  -0.3884  -0.1194   0.6352   0.8630   0.2816   0.6596  -0.0543
          Ex    -0.1334   0.6606   0.7749  -0.0187  -0.0897  -0.5242  -0.3943   0.6757
         ACP     0.2996   0.7969   0.8299   0.2178  -0.1243  -0.3397  -0.2926   1.0000
          BD    -0.2908  -0.6955  -0.4081   0.3774   0.7260   0.5903   1.0000
          In    -0.2749  -0.6235  -0.6109   0.3866   0.5121   1.0000
          VA    -0.3883  -0.4332  -0.2979   0.7128   1.0000
          RQ     0.0651   0.0017  -0.0820   1.0000
        PSAV     0.0689   0.6972   1.0000
          GE     0.4428   1.0000
          CC     1.0000
                                                                                      
                     CC       GE     PSAV       RQ       VA       In       BD      ACP
economic growth. In this study an attempt has been made to develop a multiple indicators 
and multiple causes model to study institutional change and development relationship. 
There are theoretical discrepancies related to institutional change. Some economists 
believe that it is exogenous while others support point of view that it is endogenous. 
However, it is a multidimensional phenomenon. There is no unique measure which can 
represent institutional change perfectly. Furthermore, it is also not clear whether 
economic development cause institutional change or vice versa. In this situation MIMIC 
model is considered an appropriate technique of estimation. As it is a multiple causes 
model therefore model does not need to be unidirectional. In addition to this it does not 
pose usual time series restriction on data and variables included can be ordinal or 
continuous. 
 Results show that all variables included in the model are significant. There exists 
causal association between latent variable and measurement indicators. Control of 
corruption, rule of law and voice accountability seems to be most important in causing 
institutional change. Policies should focus on these dimensions. Control of corruption 
will also reduce government expenditure which is positively associated with institutional 
change. It can be seen that privatization (measured as availability of domestic credit for 
private sector) has a positive impact on institutional change. This implies that there is 
need for domestic resource mobilization in order to increase the availability of credit for 
private sector. Macroeconomic stability is important, therefore, there is need to control 
inflation in the country. 
 The results of this study should be used cautiously. Longer time series may 
improve these results but because of unavailability of institutional data it remains a task 
for future. Lastly, it should be kept in mind that institutional change is taken as a latent 
variable hence exact measure remains elusive. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Stata Output: MIMIC Model 
 
. 
Discr. test of model vs. saturated: chi2(77)  =     0.00, Prob > chi2 = 1.0000
                                                                              
          DC    -.2110329          .        .       .            .           .
  GovE        
                                                                              
         ExV    -.7001201   .1058935    -6.61   0.000    -.9076676   -.4925726
  Ex          
                                                                              
          BD     .6146691          .        .       .            .           .
  In          
Covariance    
                                                                              
        e.L1     .4488881   .0207426                        .41002    .4914407
        e.VA     .6562381   .0104242                      .6361218    .6769906
        e.RL     .1400395   .0055649                      .1295465    .1513824
        e.RQ     .9531563   .0020632                      .9491211    .9572087
      e.PSAV     .8101146   .0071083                      .7963018     .824167
        e.GE     .7589574   .0084535                      .7425684    .7757081
        e.CC      .066002   .0028486                      .0606485     .071828
Variance      
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.194462   .0253717  -125.91   0.000     -3.24419   -3.144734
          L1    -.5863121   .0088897   -65.95   0.000    -.6037355   -.5688887
  VA <-       
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.809604   .0756926   -50.33   0.000    -3.957959   -3.661249
          L1    -.9273406   .0030004  -309.07   0.000    -.9332213   -.9214598
  RL <-       
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.951165   .0042763  -923.96   0.000    -3.959546   -3.942783
          L1     .2164341   .0047663    45.41   0.000     .2070922    .2257759
  RQ <-       
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.622502   .0115054  -227.94   0.000    -2.645052   -2.599952
          L1    -.4357585   .0081562   -53.43   0.000    -.4517443   -.4197726
  PSAV <-     
                                                                              
       _cons     -3.72953   .0207703  -179.56   0.000    -3.770239   -3.688821
          L1     .4909609   .0086091    57.03   0.000     .4740874    .5078345
  GE <-       
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.685038   .0579417   -46.34   0.000    -2.798602   -2.571475
          L1     .9664357   .0014738   655.76   0.000     .9635472    .9693242
  CC <-       
Measurement   
                                                                              
         ACP            0  (constrained)
     factor1            0  (constrained)
          DC     .1756636   .0040586    43.28   0.000     .1677089    .1836183
         ExV     .6775871   .0156553    43.28   0.000     .6469033    .7082708
        GovE    -.1062656   .0024552   -43.28   0.000    -.1110778   -.1014535
          Ex    -.3220035   .0074397   -43.28   0.000     -.336585   -.3074219
          BD     .2407682   .0055628    43.28   0.000     .2298653    .2516711
          In    -.3926284   .0090714   -43.28   0.000    -.4104081   -.3748487
  L1 <-       
Structural    
                                                                              
Standardized        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               EIM
                                                                              
Table 2: Goodness of Fit Tests 
 
                                                                            
                  CD        0.394   Coefficient of determination
                SRMR        0.513   Standardized root mean squared residual
Size of residuals     
                                                                            
                 TLI       -1.579   Tucker-Lewis index
                 CFI            .   Comparative fit index
Baseline comparison   
                                                                            
              pclose        1.000   Probability RMSEA <= 0.05
         upper bound            .
 90% CI, lower bound        0.000
               RMSEA        0.000   Root mean squared error of approximation
Population error      
                                                                            
            p > chi2        0.982
         chi2_bs(51)       32.077   baseline vs. saturated
            p > chi2        1.000
         chi2_ms(61)        2.625   model vs. saturated
Discrepancy           
                                                                            
Fit statistic               Value   Description
                                                                            
